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This article is intended to acquaint those whose principal concerns are the health and safety of
workers with genetic screening and some of the medical and ethical issues it raises. Population-
based genetic screening increasingly is being considered for predicting future disease in the
person being screened. A major problem in screening for alleles that contribute to the
development of common, multifactorial disorders is low sensitivity and positive predictive value.
In many instances, no demonstrably effective prophylaxis or treatment is available to help those
with positive test results. This creates ethical problems of assuring that testing is in the person's
best interest and raises in turn issues of autonomy, discrimination, and privacy. Instead of
screening for genetic predispositions to harm from workplace exposures, other means of
improving the health of workers may bring greater benefits to a higher proportion of workers. The
current state of genetic tests for chronic beryllium disease are considered. None are suitable
for screening. - Environ Health Perspect 104(Suppl 5):987-990 (1996)
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Introduction
The appendage, "An Academic View," to
the title of this article is not my creation.
Perhaps the meeting organizers thought
that the incorporation ofgenetic screening
into health care, including occupational
health, would occur faster than was war-
ranted by the concerns I raised, hence
making them "academic." Alternatively,
the appurtenance might have been
intended to distinguish my views from
either a labor or a management position.
Or, it could be the organizers' recognition
that I have had little direct experience in
occupational health. This, I must confess,
is the case (the closest being a course I
took on occupational epidemiology and
service on an Office of Technology
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(1)]. In view of this shortcoming, the
papers and discussion in the symposium
have greatly enlightened me. Ifanything, I
am more cautious than before, as I will
explain, first by defining genetic testing
and considering both medical and ethical
aspects, and second by examining genetic




Genetic screening is population-based
testing for the presence of inherited dis-
ease-causing or susceptibility-conferring
alleles to predict the risk of future disease
in the person being tested or in his or her
future children. (A positive result might
also provide information about genetic
risks of already-born children, siblings,
cousins, and other relatives.) The disease
can be single gene (Mendelian) in origin,
or complex, involving more than one gene
or a combination of genetic and environ-
mental factors. Genetic screening does not
include testing for the presence ofacquired
mutations or chromosomal aberrations that
might result from occupational exposures.
Such testing is referred to as "monitoring"
(1). It provides a sensitive indicator of
potentially toxic exposure levels but not of
inherited genetic susceptibilities.
Before beginning routine genetic
screening, a pilot phase is often needed to
validate the test. People with positive test
results, and a sample ofthose with negative
results, are systematically followed to deter-
mine the sensitivity, specificity, and posi-
tive predictive value (PPV) ofthe test. The
benefits and risks offollow-up interventions
also need to be established in those with
positive test results. If-and only if-
screening improves the outcome in ways
that would not be possible by waiting for
the disease to appear, is there value in it (2).
PPV-the chance that a person with a
positive result will get the disease
depends on the prevalence ofthe disease in
the population being tested; for a test of
certain specificity and sensitivity, the
greater the prevalence, the greater the PPV.
When the cutpoint for distinguishing posi-
tive from negative results can be varied
(e.g., as in measuring enzyme activity or
metabolite concentration), a cutpoint that
gives the best ratio offalse negatives to false
positives can be chosen. Selecting this cut-
point will depend on the relative costs, in
both economic and medical terms, of false
negatives and false positives. When a
definitive treatment that greatly improves
outcome is available and is effective only as
a consequence of presymptomatic detec-
tion, and when an independent, simple,
inexpensive method is available to deter-
mine whether a result is a true or false posi-
tive, the cutpoint can be set to maximize
sensitivity. Screening of newborn infants
for phenylketonuria is an example.
Unfortunately, particularly in genetic test-
ing, independent, confirmatory tests are
not often available. Then, a false positive
could be much more costly, subjecting
people to unnecessary treatment that might
last a lifetime. A false positive in prenatal
diagnosis could result in the abortion ofan
unaffected fetus.
For direct DNA tests, including tests
for histocompatibility alleles, as well as
tests for HLA antigens, the cutpoint, in the
traditional sense, cannot be varied. These
are qualitative, binary tests that look for
the presence or absence of specific muta-
tions or their consequences on protein
structure. For many genetic diseases, hun-
dreds of mutations can each interfere with
the function of a single gene; with current
technology, it is not possible to detect all of
them or their functional consequences.
Consequently, false negatives are inevitable.
Thus if the adult population were to be




offered screening for genetic susceptibilities
to breast or colon cancer, not all people
possessing inherited susceptibility muta-
tions (ISMs) would be detected. Nor would
those without ISMs who will still get the
cancer. Yet they comprise the vast majority
ofthosewho will develop the malignancy.
Genetic screening could be justified
from a medical (but not necessarily an eco-
nomic) perspective if the people detected
would derive benefit, ifthere were no alter-
native way of identifying them, and if no
harm were done to those with false positive
or negative test results. However, people
with negative results might acquire a false
sense ofsecurity in the mistaken beliefthat
they are not at risk. They could disregard
means of detecting the disease early (e.g,
mammography or colonoscopy) or of
reducing the chance ofits occurrence (e.g.,
diet modification). For complex diseases,
such as cancer, it is also possible that a per-
son found to have an ISM will never
develop the disease; other genetic and envi-
ronmental factors, usually not elucidated,
will be needed. Thus, despite the elegance
of this new technology we have problems
of false positives as well as false negatives.
From an economic perspective, screening
would make little sense when the cost of
screening is high in relation to the averted
costs. These will be low ifonly a small pro-
portion of those at risk for the disease
either opt for screening or have a disease
detected. The averted costs are more likely
to be low (if we exclude years of life lost
from the analysis) if the disease is rapidly
fatal rather than chronic.
When we consider screening for genetic
predispositions to disease from occupa-
tional exposures, we also have to consider
additional problems. First, the exposure
may have more than one harmful effect,
e.g., cancer as well as chronic lung disease.
A person who has a negative test result for
a predisposition to one harmful effect might
still be vulnerable to another. Second, false
positive results could result in unnecessary
loss oflivelihood and health benefits if the
employees are fired, or quit voluntarily in
the mistaken belief that the exposure will




With genetic tests increasingly used to
predict disease in apparently healthy peo-
ple, but with inherent uncertainty about
safety and effectiveness, ethical concerns
arise more often than with most other tests
usually used in people with overt disease. I
will deal with four: autonomy, discrimina-
tion, privacy, andjustice.
Autonomy
Unaware that they may be at increased risk
offuture disease, or ofthe ability ofgenetic
tests to predict risks, people may not
initiate requests to be tested. Healthcare
providers could obtain specimens without
even asking permission. For DNA tests,
obtaining the specimen is often less risky
than drawing blood; plucking a few hairs
or swabbing the buccal mucosa usually
suffices. So with minimal risks of testing
per se and the recognition that most people
will have negative results, why bother
informing them beforehand? The answer
lies in the implications ofthe test as well as
the uncertainties attached to both positive
and negative results. In the case of carrier
and prenatal genetic testing, a positive test
result raises reproductive options, includ-
ing abortion, that are so abhorrent to some
people that they would prefer to remain
ignorant of the risks. Similarly, the uncer-
tainty ofresults could make some people so
uncomfortable that they would rather
forego knowledge oftheir risk. For instance,
as long as there was even a small amount
of uncertainty involved in testing for
Huntington disease, some people who
knew they were at risk preferred not to be
tested (3). In addition, health or life insur-
ance companies could require results of
genetic tests performed by the patient's own
physician and use them to deny or limit
coverage or to charge higher premiums. So,
here too, some people might decide they
would be better offnot knowing their risks.
To make such a decision, people have to be
informed about testing, and its implications
and uncertainties, and given the opportu-
nity to decide whether or not they want the
test. Only then is autonomy respected.
Personal autonomy can be curtailed
in testing by employers. Although employ-
ers can no longer test at will under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
they can require tests after a conditional
offer ofemployment has been made. If a
test result indicates a reasonable probability
ofimminent threat to the worker or to oth-
ers in the performance ofa specific job, the
conditional offer can be withdrawn (4).
Genetic tests could reveal susceptibility to
harm from a workplace exposure, or a con-
dition that could harm the worker or others
regardless ofexposure. (In Marfan disease,
for instance, rupture ofan aortic aneurysm
on the job could acutely incapacitate the
worker and thereby hurt also others on the
job.) Under the ADA, workers with posi-
tive test results who can perform the essen-
tial functions of the job without threat to
themselves or others decide whether to
accept a job that may adversely affect their
health (5).
Until recently, the Equal Employment
Opportunities Commission (EEOC), the
agency that enforces the ADA, maintained
that an individual is not covered under the
law until he or she is symptomatic (6).
Recently, however, the EEOC reversed
itself and ruled that a healthy individual
with a genetic trait that increased the
risk of future illness was protected (7).
Consequently, genetic testing cannot be
used before a conditional offer ofemploy-
ment is made.
Discrlmination
Denying employment to asymptomatic job
applicants with positive genetic test results
constitutes discrimination. Society might
view it as "fair" discrimination when, as
discussed above, hiring a worker with a
genetic susceptibility to a particular disease
poses an imminent threat to the worker or
others in the performance of the job and
the employer cannot make a reasonable
accommodation to protect the worker.
Instead of refusing to hire, the employer
could place the worker in a job in which he
or she would not be at risk. If this job had
comparable worth, this would not be
unfair discrimination. If no such job is
available, and the threat is exclusively to
the predisposed worker, the courts have
ruled that workers have the right to decide
whether to take the riskyjob (8).
To individuals with genetic susceptibil-
ities, and to the society that ultimately
foots the bill, denying health insurance to
people with positive genetic test results (or
excluding from coverage the condition to
which tests predict they are predisposed) is
unfair discrimination (9). Insurance com-
panies who pay health benefits maintain,
on the other hand, that such discrimina-
tion is fair; people with higher risks should
pay more (10). If they did not and were
granted insurance at the standard pre-
mium, the costs incurred as they became ill
(or, in the case of life insurance, as they
purchased more in anticipation of dying
early) would increase the company's costs,
which are passed on to those without the
predisposition in the form ofhigher premi-
ums. The standard premium takes into
consideration the prevalence of diseases
that cannot be predicted. The development
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ofpredictive tests allows insurance compa-
nies to exclude people with predispositions
and lower the premium for others, thereby
compensating for the exclusion by increas-
ing demand for its product. Employers
could exclude the conditions to which test-
ing reveals some workers to be predisposed
from their health benefits if there were an
actuarial basis for doing so. Some states
have prohibited genetic testing by employ-
ers if the test is not job related (11,12).
State laws do not cover employers who
insure themselves. The federal law that cov-
ers them (Employee Retirement Income
Security Act [ERISA]) does not prohibit
such discrimination.
Privacy
The list of parties interested in the results
ofgenetic tests does not stop with insurers
and employers. Adoption agencies, schools,
banks, mortgage companies, and family
members might all claim an interest in the
test result. Access to the results by all of
these groups, except possibly family mem-
bers, might lead to action detrimental to
persons being tested or to their offspring.
In view of the limitations of genetic tests,
which might not be appreciated by all those
seeking access, the actions might be ground-
less. Fear that third parties will have access
to results could well deter people from being
tested even though they believe that they
would benefit. Similarly, were health care
providers to reveal people's genetic status to
family members from whom the people
feared retribution, confidence in the
provider could be undermined. In a recent
study ofcystic fibrosis carrier screening, we
found that fear ofbeing stigmatized was one
of the few variables that predicted which
people would agree to be tested (13).
In certain circumstances (previous sec-
tion) employers have legitimate interests in
the implications of genetic test results for
workers' abilities to perform jobs safely and
effectively. Regardless ofwhether tests are
performed by, or reported to, employers'
agents (as is likely when the test is for predis-
position to conditions for which workplace
exposures might cause harm) or performed
outside the workplace by workers' private
physicians, employers do not need to know
the result of any specific test but only
whether work restrictions or accommoda-
tions are needed (14). Even then, as Sheldon
Samuels points out (personal communica-
tion), ifa new genetic screening program in
the workplace is followed by the simultane-
ous transfer of30% ofworkers, it is obvious
who is predisposed.
Workers have the right to consent to
who should receive test results. They also
have the right to know their own test
results. Moreover, in testing for susceptibil-
ities to harm from workplace exposures or
for predisposition to future serious disease,
they should be apprised of the risks and
what could be done to lower them.
Justice
In many instances, genetic testing will
reveal only a small proportion ofpeople at
risk ofdeveloping disease. The population
from which these people are drawn may
have many more prevalent health problems
or problems that are more amenable to pre-
vention or cure than is the case for genetic
predispositions. This raises the problem of
allocation ofscarce resources. Some people
will be harmed if one action is taken,
whereas others will be harmed if another
course is chosen. When screening cannot
be economically justified, investment
should be placed elsewhere or other means





Saltini's work makes it clear that we do not
yet have a test that meets the criteria for
genetic screening. Testing for HLA-DPB1
Glu69 has a sensitivity for predicting chronic
beryllium disease (CBD) of 80% and a
specificity of69.7%. With a prevalence of
CBD of3.9%, the test for Glu69 has a PPV
ofonly 9.8% (C Saltini, unpublished data).
It is likely that HLA-DPB1 Glu69 is
not the only risk factor for CBD in
exposed workers. Both Saltini and Kreiss
(K Kreiss, unpublished data) reported that
the odds that machinists would get CBD
are considerably higher than for other
exposed workers. Machinists apparently
have the highest exposure to beryllium
and, in one ceramics plant, their exposure
exceeded the permissible limit (M Mroz,
unpublished data). According to Saltini's
data, being a machinist and having HLA-
DPB1 Glu69 are independent risk factors
for CBD. Rossman's work (15) suggests
that HLA-DR might also play a role in
CBD. Kreiss (K Kreiss, unpublished data)
suggests that smokers may have delayed
onset of CBD, perhaps because smoking
inhibits the immune response even when
DPB1 Glu69 is present. It is possible that
testing for the simultaneous presence of
the susceptibility-conferring HLA-DR and
DP alleles might improve both sensitivity
and specificity, leading to greater predic-
tive value.
Even if the DPB1 Glu69 test accurately
predicted those who will get CBD, there
may be other consequences of beryllium
exposure that the test fails to detect. At very
high doses, beryllium might be sensitizing
regardless ofthe immunoreceptors present;
at such doses it apparently leads to an acute
disease and may also be carcinogenic (16).
Cancer might also be more likely to occur
in those with CBD; the data are not good
enough to allow us to confirm that.
We should note, too, that the beryl-
lium-specific lymphocyte proliferation test
(BeLPT) is not perfectly sensitive (17,18).
Thus workers with negative test results
might not be protected from harm from
beryllium exposure. Finally, if either the
BeLPT or DPB1 Glu69 test were to be
used routinely, more laboratories would get
into the act and laboratory error, which has
been demonstrated for both tests, could
become a significant problem [(15); T
Markham, unpublished data].
I doubt that even tests for all known
genetic susceptibilities to CBD will have
high enough sensitivities or PPVs to war-
rant screening. Moreover, with almost one-
third of the labor force having one genetic
risk factor (HLA-DPB1 Glu69), a large
number ofworkers who would never get
CBD could be denied jobs (although the
EEOC ruling that the ADA covered genetic
screening for susceptibility might prevent
that). Employers might tolerate this high
exclusion rate if the supply of qualified
labor is plentiful. But if that is the case, it
means other jobs are not available and the
spin of the genetic roulette wheel will
determine who will remain unemployed.
Some people looking for jobs would, out of
desperation, take their chances on getting a
disease in the future in return for feeding
their families in the present.
Genetic studies will often prove more
important for research into mechanisms
than for routine testing. In conducting
research, the worker has the right to know
what hypotheses are being tested. If the
purpose ofthe research is to determine the
frequency ofan allele known to predispose
a worker to harm from workplace expo-
sure, the worker has a right to know the
results as well, even if no action is planned
when those with genetic predispositions are
found. Until genetic screening can be
shown to have high sensitivity and PPV,
justice would dictate that other means be
sought for reducing the occurrence of
CBD. One means ofdoing so, particularly
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important in light of the reports showing
that workers (machinists) with higher
exposure are more likely to get CBD, is to
lower ambient levels ofberyllium. The fail-
ure to do so brings me to my second con-
cern: whether most of the research on
CBD is really intended to benefit workers.
If it were, this symposium might have
included more talks about interventions in
workers sensitized to beryllium. In this
entire conference there was not one presen-
tation on the effectiveness of treatment.
Rossman indicated that there "have been
no controlled studies to determine the
optimal treatment" for CBD (16). At the
very least, this gives the appearance that
concern for the welfare of the worker is
not really uppermost. The rejoinder, of
course, is that by identifying predisposed
workers or sensitized workers they can be
removed from exposure. This serves the
employer at least as well as it serves the
worker, first, by reducing worker's
compensation payments and second, by
obviating the need to reduce workplace
exposures, or even more drastically, finding
less toxic substitutes for beryllium. With
almost 1 in 25 workers getting CBD (C
Saltini, unpublished data), one cannot
consider CBD a trivial problem.
Conclusions
1. Genetic screening poses issues that do
not arise for many other medical tests.
2. Few genetic tests have sufficient sen-
sitivity and PPV to be used in the work-
place. The U.S. Congress Office of
Technology Assessment reached this con-
clusion in two separate studies (1,19).
3. In the workplace and elsewhere,
looking for genetic determinants ofdisease
becomes a form of victim blaming and
excuses industry from its responsibility in
the prevention and treatment ofdisease.
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